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RECENT DECISIONS
multaneous admission of sub-standard ability, the Court has strengthened its
conviction of the dignity which should adhere to all Constitutional guarantees.
Thomas H. Rosinski
Self-Incrimination: Statute Discovered After Claim
Defendant appeared before a special grand jury microscoping crime in the
New York City garment and trucking industries. He testified extensively, stating
that he paid gratuities to certain persons but refusing to. state to whom and in
what amounts, first upon ground that it would hurt his business and that persons
paid would never admit having received any money, and later, after brief consul-
tation with counsel, on the ground that his answers would tend to incriminate
him. On appeal from a finding of contempt, held (2-1): defendant not guilty of
contempt since answers to further questions would have supplied leads to possible
conviction under the Internal Revenue Code. United States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d
921 (2d Cir. 1956).
There has not been deep controversy over the legal and historical origins of
the privilege against self-incrimination. The best writings on the subject have
been created to explain how the privilege arose, and how the popular judgment
took root that it was better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than that the
prosecution should be able to construct a criminal case, in whole or in part, with
the aid of forced disclosures by the witness. See WGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2250-
2266 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1949); GRISWOLD, THE FIm AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). Nor has
there been serious disapproval over the power of the court to decide whether any
direct answer to a question would implicate the witness. United States v. Burr (In
re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (C.C.D. Va. 1807); Ellwell v. United
States, 275 Fed. 775 (7th Cir. 1921); cf. Ex parte Irvine, 74 Fed. 954 (C.C. S.D.
Ohio 1896).
Strong differences of opinion, in which the privilege has been treated both
as a vestige and a commandment, have centered around the questions concerning
the extent of the privilege, when it must be raised, and when it is waived. It has
been said that its invocation in certain instances has been tantamount to an admis-
sion of guilt. See- O'Connor, The Fifth Amendment: Should A Good Friend Be
Abused?, 41 A.B.A.J. 307-10, 369-70 (1955). On the other hand, its invocation
is viewed as a protection of innocence. Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225 (1st
Cir. 1954), with a penetrating analysis by Chief Judge Magruder. Courts have
attempted to map out only the broad, hazy outlines in each problem area. Decisions
of great importance have, unfortunately, been delivered at times when the climate
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of opinion was not conducive to an adequately objective approach. See, e.g., Rogers
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951). The Rogers case could be said to have
marked the low-water point of the privilege against self-incrimination, with the
subsequent reaction to the decision resulting in opinions more favorable toward
the privilege, delivered in times less crowded with marked emotionalism. See
Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 (1954); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.
S. 155, 160 (1954).
The results in the instant case may very well mark the furthest extension yet
encountered of the presumption in favor of the claimant, to an area not even
remotely connected to the matter under inquiry, concerning an offense unknown to
the claimant at the time of the invocation of the privilege, but rather unearthed
after a thorough search. 231 F.2d at 925, 926 (dissent). Also, the case leaves
unsolved the problems relating to the reliability and significance of the facts and
circumstances placed before the judge who must determine whether the privilege
is or is not available to the claimant. In Blau' v. United States, 340 U. S. 159
(1950), the privilege was said to extend to answers that would in themselves
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a
federal crime. But it has been pointed out that the protection must be confined to
instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a
direct answer, not a danger of an imaginary or insubstantial character having
reference to some barely possible contingency. Mason v. United States, 244 U. S.
362, 365 (1917); Regina v. Boyes, 1 B&S 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
It was evident in a decision cited by the majority in the instant case that the
implications from the questions asked, in the setting presented, and taking into
consideration the public reputation of the witness, that a responsive answer to the
questions asked or an explanation of why they could not be answered, would have
placed the witness in a dangerous position. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S.
479 (1951). Such factors were absent in the instant case at the time the questions
relating to the gratuities were asked of the witness, and upon appeal, the majority
apparently found that the privilege was properly invoked, since they were presentd
with a federal criminal provision by counsel for the defendant. Even assuming that
the information requested could in some way furnish a link in the chain of evi-
dence necessary for a conviction under a pertinent statute, how can it be said
that the defendant in the instant case had reasonable cause to fear prosecution at
the time the questions were asked, hence claim the privilege, when he did not even
know of the statute, nor of its possible application to his actions? The total absence
of reasonable or substantial cause to fear prosecution is all the more apparent in
the instant case where the statute in question requires a willful attempt to evade
the statutory mandate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§7203 and 6041. An honest
misunderstanding would not be grounds for the imposition of any punitive sanc-
tions. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933). Applying the standards
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established in the Hoffman case, the district court determined that the witness
merely seized upon the privilege as a last ditch means to avoid answering questions
which would prove valuable to the special grand jury investigating the garment
district in New York.
It appears obvious that if the courts excuse witnesses from testifying where
their lawyers can unearth a possible stautory violation after refusal, then grand
jury investigations will be severely hindered. Contempt will not then turn on
whether in fact the witness believed he would be incriminated by his statements,
but rather whether a higher tribunal can supply the necessary statute which could
presumably be violated. No longer will the judge, faced with the witness, aware of
any facts revealed during the course of his questioning, be able to give full
weight to the entire surroundings in determining whether the witness in good
faith believes himself in danger of self-incrimination. Such a sweeping effect
reached through the approach of the majority in the instant case cannot lightly be
overlooked, and the privilege itself is open to a severe question whether, on close
inspection and study, it in truth serves the public interest.
Thomas T. Basil
In Rem; Tax Foreclosre-Notice
Property owner was known by the town officials to be an unprotected
incompetent. The town had fulfilled the requirements of section 165-b of the
New York Tax Law by posting, publishing and mailing notice of an action to
foreclose a tax lien on the incompetent's property. Since the taxpayer neither
answered within twenty days nor paid her back taxes within seven weeks, a
default judgment of foreclosure was entered and a deed was executed to the
town. Held (8-1): Such notice was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
due process. Covey v. Town of Sommers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956).
No person may be deprived of his property without due process of law,
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV; N. Y. CONST. art. 1, §6. One of the basic requirements
of this unrdefined concept is that notice, reasonably calculated to inform the party
of a pending action, must be given. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
The notice which is required will vary with the circumstances and conditions
peculiar to the particular situation. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 351 U. S. 200
(1956).
Although the Constitution does not specify any one particular method of
notice, that which is given must be calculated to be actual and effective. Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940). A state legislature may establish a method of
